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‘Our legal responsibility … to intervene on behalf of the child’1: recognising 
public responsibilities for the medical treatment of children  
Professor Jo Bridgeman, Sussex Law School, University of Sussex 
 
Abstract 
This article argues for recognition of public responsibilities to protect the welfare of 
children with respect to decisions affecting their health and medical treatment. As the 
quote in the title of this article, from David Plank, the Director of Social Services 
responsible for bringing the case of Baby Alexandra before the courts, identifies, early 
cases concerning children’s medical treatment were brought by local authorities to 
determine responsibilities to protect the welfare of children. In cases such as Re B 
(1981), Re J (1990), and Re W (1992) the court was asked not only to determine the 
child’s best interests but also to clarify the duties of the local authority, Trust, court, 
and child’s parents to the child. The respective duties established apply to all involved 
in cases brought before the courts on the question of a child’s future medical treatment, 
whether or not the child is in the care of the state. Recent cases concerning the medical 
treatment of seriously ill children have involved claims of parental authority to 
determine the care of their child. To the contrary, this article argues that court 
involvement is required when parents are disagreed with the child’s treating doctors 
over the child’s medical treatment because of public as well as parental and 
professional responsibilities for the welfare of all children. 
 
Introduction: Reflecting on over four decades of Case Law  
The invitation to deliver the 2019 Annual Public Lecture of the Health Law Regulation 
Unit and European Children’s Rights Unit a quarter of a century after I started my 
academic career in the Liverpool Law School prompted me to reflect back on my 
subject, the legal regulation of the provision of medical treatment to children. 
Reviewing the body of case law over the past forty years, I observed that in a significant 
number of the early cases and in cases throughout the body of case law, local 
authorities were involved either because the child was in local authority care, or 
because the child’s doctors had sought the advice of the local authority given the 
latter’s child protection duties. That led me to reflect upon cases concerned with a 
child’s health or medical treatment from the perspective of public responsibilities for 
the care, and protection of the welfare, of children. This is recognised in the title of my 
lecture and this article, which starts with a quote from David Plank, who was Director 
of Social Services responsible for bringing the case of Baby Alexandra before the court 
in 1981,2 both of whom I return to below. 
 
This article first examines the initial cases brought before the courts by a local authority 
which required the courts to determine the duties of parents, local authorities, doctors 
and the courts and established the protective role of the court when issues of a child’s 
health or medical treatment are before it. It then explains the allocation of 
responsibilities between parents, local authorities, and the court by the Children Act 
1989 which provides the framework for children’s medical treatment cases as well as 
for child law more generally. The respective responsibilities are then considered in the 
cases concerned with older children in local authority care who have refused medical 
                                                 
1  Janet Read and Luke Clements, ‘Demonstrably Awful: The Right to Life and the 
Selective Non-Treatment of Disabled Babies and Young Children’ (2004) 31 JLS 482-
509, 501 quoting David Plank, personal interview. This article is a written version of the 
2019 Annual Public Lecture of the Heath Law and Regulation Unit and European 
Children’s Rights Unit. My thanks to Amel Alghrani and Helen Stalford for the invitation, 
the audience for their questions and comments and the anonymous reviewers for their 
comments on an earlier draft. 
2  Re B (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
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treatment; parental refusal due to their religious beliefs; termination of a child’s 
pregnancy; immunisation of children in care; and, the participation of the local authority 
in cases of withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from children with life-
limiting conditions. It argues that the involvement of the public authorities – the local 
authority bringing cases into the public realm of the court – resulted from and led to 
identification of public responsibilities. The doctor/patient relationship and the cases 
which arise due to disagreements about medical treatment or health are matters of 
private law and decisions about a child’s medical treatment are ordinarily private 
decisions made together by parents and doctors but, this article demonstrates, they 
also involve public responsibilities for the welfare and protection of children. Further, 
whilst the involvement of the court provides an important protective role in respect of 
children in the care of the state, it is argued that this is equally its role – public 
responsibility for the protection of the welfare of the child - in disputes between parents 
and doctors about a child’s medical treatment.3 
 
The First Reported Cases: bringing decisions into the public domain 
The first reported case in which the decision of the child’s parent and doctor was 
referred to court, Re D in 1976, concerned non-therapeutic sterilisation rather than the 
medical treatment of a child.4 As Heilbron J observed the case involved ‘entirely novel 
circumstances’ for a wardship application. However, the judge considered that 
wardship was appropriate, as she could not ‘conceive of a more important step’ than 
the proposed non-consensual non-therapeutic sterilisation of the child.5 Furthermore, 
the case raised a ‘matter of principle of considerable public importance’.6 Before the 
court, the consultant paediatrician claimed that the decision was a matter for clinical 
judgement as long there was consent from the parent. Heilbron J responded that the 
reasons given for sterilising D were both clinical and social which meant that the 
decision was not solely a matter of medical expertise. On the facts, the judge 
concluded that the sterilisation operation was not necessary, medically indicated, nor 
in D’s best interests7 and declined to authorise the operation.8 The case established 
the role of the court, placing the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration,9 
in the determination of the issue referred to it, not by the child’s parent or doctor, but 
by the local education authority given that others involved in D’s care had formed a 
different view about her best interests. The decision whether D should undergo a 
sterilisation operation was not a private matter for her mother and paediatrician, others 
had caring responsibilities to her which, when they profoundly disagreed with the 
                                                 
3  The balance of responsibilities between parents, doctors, local authorities, and the 
court in the law governing children’s medical treatment is examined in Jo Bridgeman, 
Medical Treatment of Children and the Law: Beyond Parental Responsibilities, 
Routledge, 2020. 
4  Re D (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185. 
5  Re D [1976] Fam 185, 196. 
6  Re D [1976] Fam 185, 187. 
7  Re D [1976] Fam 185, 196. Helen Stalford has explained that best interests is 
‘universally regarded as a central tenet of children’s rights’, `The broader relevance of 
children's rights law: The ̀ `best interests of the child'' principle' in Children's Rights Law 
in the Global Human Rights Landscape: Isolation, Inspiration, Integration?, E. Brems 
et al. (eds), 2017, 37-51. This was demonstrated by the Children’s Rights Judgments 
Project of the European Children’s Rights Unit in their rewritten judgments concerning 
Family Life, Medical Decision-making, Public Authorities, Criminal Justice and 
International Children’s Rights, in Rewriting Children's Rights Judgments: From 
Academic Vision to New Practice, Helen Stalford et al, (eds), Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2017. 
8  Re D [1976] Fam 185, 194.  
9  Re D [1976] Fam 185, 194.  
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decision, gave them a legitimate interest in seeking an independent determination of 
the court in the exercise of its protective jurisdiction to children. 
 
In the 1981 case of Baby Alexandra, Re B,10 the health authority sought the advice of 
the local authority when Alexandra’s parents refused their consent to surgery to 
remove an intestinal blockage given their view that, as she had Down’s Syndrome, she 
would not enjoy a quality of life. Against the background of the prosecution of Dr Arthur 
following the death of John Pearson whom he had instructed should be given ‘nursing 
care only’ after his parents rejected him because he had Down’s Syndrome,11 the local 
authority applied to court to clarify the legal obligations of doctors, parents, and social 
services in relation to decisions concerning the medical treatment of a child. Upon the 
application of the local authority, Ewbank J made Alexandra a ward of court and gave 
the local authority care and control so that it could give consent to the operation. 
However, the surgeon at the hospital to which Alexandra had been moved for the 
surgery declined to operate given the refusal of her parents. The local authority brought 
the matter back before Ewbank J who determined that the wishes of the parents should 
be respected despite the surgeon at the hospital where she had been born being 
prepared to carry out the operation. That conclusion supported the view that this was 
a private decision to be reached by parents together with doctors. However, the local 
authority appealed. The Court of Appeal emphasised that, as the issue had been 
brought before the court in wardship proceedings, it was the duty of the court to 
determine whether surgery was in Alexandra’s best interests. Brought to court by the 
local authority uncertain of the applicable legal obligations, the court exercised its 
independent duty to determine the welfare of the child and authorised the procedure.12 
Through the intervention of the local authority and the decision of the court, public 
responsibilities for the protection of the welfare of the child were fulfilled.  
 
In their article on the withholding of life-sustaining treatment from babies with 
disabilities, Janet Read and Luke Clements quoted David Plank, the Director of Social 
Services for the local authority in Re B, who had said to them in an interview:  
 
‘We decided that clearly it was right that the baby should have the operation 
because the baby was an independent person and had a right to life ... It was 
our legal responsibility as a social services authority to intervene on behalf of 
the child ... [T]he arguments that were being made against having the 
operation, basically did not distinguish between the parents and the child and 
saw the child wholly as a possession of the parents. And in law, that's not right 
and morally that's not right.’13   
 
Janet Reid and Luke Clements observed that the case resulted in unprecedented 
‘public interrogation’ of medical practice and of decisions which had previously been 
                                                 
10  Re B (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421.     
11  R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1. Anne Morris observed that R v Arthur had drawn public 
attention to the practice of withholding treatment from children with disabilities, Anne 
Morris, ‘Selective treatment of irreversibly impaired infants: Decision-making at the 
threshold’ (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 347–376, 348. 
12  Michael Freeman reported that Alexandra was temporarily taken into care in the 
exercise of the local authority’s protective duties to the child, although a few months 
later she was returned to the care of her parents, The Rights and Wrongs of Children. 
London: Pinter, 1983, 262. 
13  Janet Read and Luke Clements, ‘Demonstrably Awful: The Right to Life and the 
Selective Non-Treatment of Disabled Babies and Young Children’ (2004) 31 JLS 482-
509, 501. 
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reached privately between parents and doctors.14 The decision of the court established 
that it was not lawful for parents and doctors to leave a child to die just because that 
child had disabilities.15 But, furthermore, the importance of Re B together with Re D for 
debates about the role of law in regulating medical practice and the responsibilities of 
parents, professionals, and public authorities with regard to children cannot be 
overstated. The cases demonstrated the responsibilities of doctors to seek the advice 
of local authorities, the responsibility of the local authority to intervene and, where 
necessary to protect the welfare and interests of the child, to refer the question to court 
and for the court to exercise its protective jurisdiction in determination of the welfare of 
the child. Whilst these cases involve personal decisions concerning dependent 
children, they are a matter of public concern as they raise fundamental questions about 
the value of life and public as well as private responsibilities to vulnerable children who 
are unable to articulate their own interests. The framework within which these 
responsibilities were to be exercised was then provided by the Children Act 1989.   
 
The Children Act 1989: framing the responsibilities of parents, public authorities 
and the State 
The Children Act 1989 is central to the legal framework for decision-making about 
children’s medical treatment.16 Following review by the Law Commission of private law 
and a government review of public law concerning children,17 the Children Act 1989 
created a comprehensive legislative framework bringing together public and private 
law concerning the care, protection, and upbringing of children. It provides a coherent 
set of legal concepts and principles across child welfare in the resolution of disputes 
concerning children, support services for children in need, and compulsory powers for 
child protection. Nigel Parton, writing in 1991, argued that the Children Act was 
concerned with ‘constructing a new consensus’ or ‘a new set of balances related to the 
respective roles and responsibilities of the state and the family in the upbringing of 
children’.18 
 
Issues of children’s medical treatment were clearly envisaged as coming within the 
scope of the Children Act 1989. Decisions about a child’s medical treatment are made 
in the exercise of parental responsibility,19 a concept introduced by the Act. The 
concept encapsulates both that parents have responsibilities to their children rather 
than rights over them and that children are primarily the responsibility of their parents, 
                                                 
14  Janet Read and Luke Clements, ‘Demonstrably Awful: The Right to Life and the 
Selective Non-Treatment of Disabled Babies and Young Children’ (2004) 31 JLS 482-
509, 501. 
15  Jonathan Herring, ‘Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment); “The Child Must 
Live”: Disability, Parents and the Law’ in Landmark Cases in Medical Law, Jonathan 
Herring and Jesse Wall (eds), Hart, 2015, 63-81, 66. 
16  Detailed more fully in Jo Bridgeman, Medical Treatment of Children and the Law: 
Beyond Parental Responsibilities, Routledge, 2020, ch. 2. 
17  There were four Law Commission working papers on child law: Review of Child Law: 
Guardianship (Law Com No 91, 1985); Review of Child Law: Custody (Law Com No 
96, 1986); Review of Child Law: Care, Supervision and Interim Orders in Custody 
Proceedings (Law Com No 100, 1987); Review of Child Law: Wards of Court (Law Com 
No 101, 1987) informing the recommendations in its report, Law Commission, Review 
of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody (Law Com No 172, 1988) which provide the 
basis for the private law provisions. The Department of Health and Social Security, 
Review of Child Care Law. Report to Ministers of an Interdepartmental Working Party 
(HMSO, 1985) and White Paper, The Law on Child Care and Family Services (Cm 62, 
1987) inform the public law provisions.  
18  Nigel Parton, Governing the Family: Child Care, Child Protection and the State, 
Macmillan, 1991, 148. 
19  Re A [2001] Fam 147, 178. 
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not the state.20  The role of the state is to support parents to fulfil their responsibilities 
to their children. 
 
Different opinions about a child’s upbringing held by those with parental responsibility 
or with an interest in the child’s welfare21 can be referred to court for the court to 
determine in a Specific Issue Order or Prohibited Steps Order.22 Decisions about a 
child’s medical treatment can also be referred to court in an application for the court to 
exercise its inherent jurisdiction, although local authorities require leave to make an 
application. In either application the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration; 
the Welfare Checklist applies to orders under the Children Act.23  
 
Whilst the Specific Issue Order and Prohibited Steps Order fall within the private law 
provisions of the Act, the public law provisions of the Children Act also form part of the 
framework within which parents, professionals, public authorities, and the courts fulfil 
their duties to children. The Children Act sets out compulsory powers for child 
protection which are founded upon a division of responsibilities between the local 
authority and the court.24 Only a local authority can initiate proceedings by asking the 
court in a fact finding hearing to determine whether the threshold set out in s.31(2) has 
been satisfied,25 only then can a court make an order according to its judgement of the 
welfare of the child. The Children Act requires NHS Trusts to assist a local authority 
which is making enquiries to decide whether any action should be taken to safeguard 
or protect the child’s welfare by providing relevant information and advice if asked to 
do so.26 The statutory obligations imposed by the Children Act 1989, the Children Act 
2004, and professional duties require a doctor to act on any concerns that the welfare 
of a child is at risk of harm from the care given by their parent by informing the 
designated doctor for child protection or seeking the advice of the safeguarding team.27 
This may, in appropriate circumstances, result in the Trust applying to court for an 
order in relation to a child’s medical treatment or seeking the advice of the local 
authority which may undertake enquiries under s.47. Child protection proceedings will 
be appropriate when parental behaviour threatens significant harm to the child. This 
may be because the child’s parents have been unable to care for their child,28 because 
the parents lack capacity to exercise parental responsibility,29 or where there are 
                                                 
20  John Eekelaar, ‘Parental responsibility: State of nature or nature of the state?’ (1991) 
13 JSWFL 37-50. 
21  Law Commission, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, No.172, 1988, 
4.41. Such as a Trust on behalf of treating doctors in relation to an issue concerning a 
child’s medical treatment.  
22  Children Act 1989, s.8. 
23  Children Act 1989, s.1.(3). 
24  Children Act 1989, Part IV. 
25  s.31(2) of the Children Act 1989 provides that: ‘A court may only make a care order or 
supervision order if it is satisfied - (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely 
to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to 
- (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, 
not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child’s 
being beyond parental control.’  
26  Children Act 1989, the persons listed in s.47(11) are any local authority, any local 
housing authority, the National Health Service Commissioning Board; any clinical 
commissioning group, Local Health Board, Special Health Authority, National Health 
Service trust or NHS foundation trust and any person authorised by the Secretary of 
State for the purposes of this section. 
27  GMC, Protecting Children and Young People: the responsibilities of all doctors (2012) 
https://www.gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/protecting-
children-and-young-people [accessed 18 May 2020).  
28  Re J [1991] Fam 33.    
29  In re Jake [2015] EWHC 2442. 
 6 
concerns that the quality of care provided presents the risk of causing the child 
significant harm because, for example, the child’s parent has ignored or acted contrary 
to medical advice.30 Importantly for the consideration of the case law which follows, 
when the court has made a care order, the local authority gains parental responsibility 
for the child which it shares with the child’s parents,31 giving the authority sufficient 
interest in decisions about a child’s medical treatment to intervene. 
  
The Children Act 2004, s.11, placed a duty on public services including NHS Trusts 
and Foundation Trusts to ensure their functions are discharged having regard to the 
need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. As MacDonald J stated in the 
recent case of Tafida Raqeeb, when there is a disagreement between parents and 
doctors as to a child’s best interests which cannot otherwise be resolved, this requires 
the Trust to apply to court for the issue to be determined. MacDonald J explained that 
to fail to do so would ‘leave a void in relation to consent’ contrary to its duties to the 
child. It would also ‘confer[…] on the parents an unimpeachable authority to make 
welfare decisions in respect of their children notwithstanding countervailing medical 
advice, which is not the position in law’.32 
 
Parents, doctors, local authorities, and the courts therefore have responsibilities with 
regard to children’s medical treatment. Parents have primary responsibility for their 
children and must make decisions about their child’s medical treatment, from the 
options available, according to their judgement of the child’s best interests. Doctors 
have professional duties to act in the best interests of the child, to work in partnership 
with parents and, where all attempts to reach an agreement have failed, to refer 
questions about a child’s medical treatment to court.33 They have a statutory duty to 
work together with the local authority to assist it to fulfil its statutory obligations. When 
a question is referred to court by someone with an interest in the case, the duty of the 
judge is to decide according to the best interests of the child. 
 
When the Children Act was passed, gaining Royal Assent in November 1989, there 
were a limited number of cases on a limited range of issues concerning the medical 
treatment of a child. The reported cases concerned with issues of a child’s medical 
treatment or health were Gillick;34 the judicial review cases of Walker (1987) and Collier 
(1988);35 Re B (1981);36 cases concerned with proposals to sterilise girls with learning 
difficulties;37 termination of pregnancy;38 and Re C concerned the withholding of life-
sustaining treatment from a baby who had been made ward of court at birth.39 Apart 
                                                 
30  In the Matter of E (A Child) [2018] EWCA Civ 550, [107] as in Westminster City Council 
v M and F and H [2017] EWHC 518. 
31  Children Act 1989, s.33(3) and may where necessary to safeguard or promote the 
child’s welfare, determine the extent to which the child’s parent, or other holders of 
parental responsibility are able to exercise parental responsibility with respect to the 
child.   
32  Tafida Raqeeb (by her Litigation Friend) v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 
2531 (Admin) & Barts NHS Foundation Trust v Shalina Begum and Muhhamed Raqeeb 
& Tafida Raqeeb (by her Children’s Guardian) [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam), [109]. 
33  The legal and professional duties of doctors to children in their care are explored in Jo 
Bridgeman, Medical Treatment of Children and the Law: Beyond Parental 
Responsibilities, Routledge, 2020, ch. 4.  
34  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another [1986] AC 112. 
35  R v Central Birmingham Health Authority, ex parte Walker 3 BMLR 32; R v Central 
Birmingham Health Authority ex parte Collier [1988] 1 WLUK 690. 
36  Re B [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
37  Re D [1976] Fam 185; Re B [1987] 2 WLR 1213; Re M [1988] 2 FLR 497. 
38  Re G-U [1984] FLR 811; Re P [1986] 1 FLR 272. 
39  Re C [1989] 3 WLR 240. 
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from Gillick (which involved a hypothetical question concerning the provision of 
contraception) and the judicial review cases, in all other reported cases the child 
concerned was either in local authority care,40 or the application was made by the local 
authority for the child to be made a ward of court for the decision to be made by the 
court.41 The next section analyses the cases which followed, adopting the approach 
which had been established in the small number of cases before the Children Act 1989 
within the framework provided by the legislation in each example considering the initial 
case law and its application in more recent cases.  
 
Local Authority Involvement in the Leading Cases of Children’s Medical 
Treatment  
Refusal of Consent by Older Children  
Two cases, Re R,42 decided shortly before the Children Act 1989 came into force, and 
Re W,43 soon after, were both formative in the case law concerning children’s medical 
decision-making. These cases have been, and continue to be, subjected to much 
academic critique,44 from a variety of perspectives but the principles remain applicable, 
most recently applied to authorise the administration of blood to 15-year old X who was 
refusing given her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. What has not been considered, and 
is a crucial aspect, which I argue influenced the approach of the court in Re R and Re 
W, is that both were applications by the local authority with respect to children in local 
authority care, raising questions about the duties of the local authority, with parental 
rights or sharing parental responsibility, and the powers of the court with respect to 
vulnerable young women.  
 
The facts of both cases are well known. However, some of the detail is forgotten behind 
academic debates about the extent to which they involved a retreat from Gillick,45 their 
effect upon respect for the autonomy of teenagers and the ability of mature minors to 
refuse consent to recommended treatment. Re R was the first reported case 
concerned with the powers of the court in wardship with respect to the refusal of 
consent by a child to recommended medical treatment. Social services had been 
involved in the care of 15 year-old R for over 12 years. R had poor, and sometimes 
violent, parental relationships and difficulties establishing boundaries. She had been 
on the ‘at risk’ register as a possible victim of emotional abuse, in voluntary care, in a 
children’s home under a place of safety order, cared for under an Interim Care Order 
and had been admitted under s.2 of the Mental Health Act 1983. At the time of the 
application she was in an adolescent psychiatric unit specialising in disturbance 
problems in young people. In short, social services had been involved in the care of R 
for much of her life. R was refusing to take medication to control her psychotic 
episodes. Those responsible for her treatment were concerned that, without 
medication, the psychotic episodes would return and there was a risk the she may 
commit suicide. Social services were of the view that the local authority could not agree 
to the administration of anti-psychotic medication against her will. 
 
                                                 
40  Re G-U [1984] FLR 811; Re P [1986] 1 FLR 272; Re B [1987] 2 WLR 1213. 
41  Re D [1976] Fam 185; Re B [1981] 1 WLR 1421; Re M [1988] 2 FLR 497. Re C [1989] 
3 WLR 240 had been made a ward of court at birth.  
42  Re R [1992] 1 FLR 190. 
43  In Re W [1993] Fam 64. 
44  Including, J Murphy, ‘W(h)ither adolescent autonomy?’ [1992] JSWFL 529; J 
Bridgeman, 'Old Enough to Know Best?' (1993) 13 Legal Studies 69; N Lowe and S 
Juss, 'Medical Treatment - pragmatism and the search for principle' (1993) 56 MLR 
865; R Thornton, 'Minors and Medical Treatment - Who Decides?' [1993] CLJ 34; J 
Eekelaar, 'White Coats or Flak Jackets? Doctors, Children and the Courts - Again' 
(1993) 109 LQR 182. 
45  Gillian Douglas, ‘The Retreat from Gillick’ (1992) 55 MLR 569-576.  
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W had been in foster care for over 7 years, following the death of her father and then 
her mother. Her aunt, her testamentary guardian, had been unable to care for W, her 
sister, and brother. The children were placed into temporary foster care before being 
moved to permanent foster care where W was bullied. The children were moved to a 
new foster home but the foster mother required treatment for cancer. W’s grandfather 
died. Shortly afterwards, W developed anorexia nervosa. At the time of the application 
by the local authority to court, W was being cared for in a specialist residential unit for 
children and adolescents but continued to lose weight and the issue was whether she 
should, contrary to her wishes, be moved to a specialist treatment centre for 
anorexia.46 The effect of the judgments in Re R and Re W  taken together, that a refusal 
to consent to recommended medical treatment by a child, whether Gillick competent 
or not, could be overridden by consent given by any holder of parental responsibility, 
including the local authority, or the court, was thus reached in the context of two 
vulnerable children in the care of the state. For different reasons and in different 
circumstances, neither R’s parents nor W’s guardian were able to provide the care 
each required, or support and guide them as they developed their independence. The 
approach of the judges to the welfare principle, that ordinarily it is in the welfare of the 
child for their wishes to be given weight but that there comes a point at which it is 
necessary to override those wishes given the other factors in the welfare checklist, was 
thus adopted in relation to teenagers who had had very difficult childhoods and lacked 
parental figures to guide and support them.  The overriding responsibility of the judge 
was to secure the welfare of the child in the exercise of a public duty to protect the 
vulnerable.    
 
These cases are formative as the judgments give guidance, specifically sought by the 
Official Solicitor in Re R, on the powers of the courts and, obiter, those with parental 
responsibility which was applied in the stream of cases that followed in the 1990s to 
much critical commentary.47 However, these cases were concerned with the protective 
exercise of the powers of the court, at the request of the local authority, a holder of 
parental rights or responsibilities and with caring responsibilities with respect to 
vulnerable young people who had had extremely difficult childhoods and were now in 
the care of the state. On the facts, this understandably led to the conclusion that the 
child should be given the treatment recommended by doctors in the exercise of their 
professional judgement as necessary to avert significant and permanent harm or 
death. By referring the issue to court, decisions about the provision of medical 
treatment contrary to the wishes of the child in the care of the state were made publicly 
ensuring that the decisions could be subject to scrutiny and debate. In my judgement, 
it is not the outcomes of these two cases that is problematic, the judges exercising 
their protective jurisdiction in respect of two troubled teenagers in the care of the state 
and at risk of death could not have been expected to conclude that refusal of the 
conventional treatment for their condition was in their best interests. As Sir James 
Munby emphasised in Re X the argument that developments including the Human 
Rights Act 1998 mean that the position in Re R and Re W permitting the invasion of 
the autonomy of a Gillick competent child no longer ‘reflects the law’ needs to be given 
                                                 
46  The application by the local authority for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction 
required the judge to be satisfied that if it did not do so, there was reasonable cause to 
believe that she was likely to suffer significant harm’, s.100(3) and (4).  
47  Including Margaret Brazier and Caroline Bridge, 'Coercion or caring: analysing 
adolescent autonomy' (1996) 16 Legal Studies 84-109; Freeman, M. “Rethinking 
Gillick”, International Journal of Children’s Rights 2005 (13), 201-217; A Morris, ‘Gillick, 
20 years on: arrested development or growing pains?’ (2005) PN 158; J Bridgeman, 
'Because we care? The Medical Treatment of Children' in Feminist Perspectives on 
Health Care Law, S Sheldon & M Thomson (eds) (1998); R Huxtable, ‘Re M (Medical 
Treatment: Consent) Time to remove the ‘flax jacket’? (2000) 12 CFLQ 83; C Bridge, 
‘Religious Beliefs and Teenage Refusal of Medical Treatment’ (1999) 62 MLR 585. 
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proper attention.48 As Margaret Brazier and Caroline Bridge have argued, the cases of 
Re R and Re W are distinguishable from those involving refusals by competent 
teenagers on the basis that defects in their reasoning meant that they did not have the 
capacity to refuse consent.49 However, in all cases the law must continue to ensure 
the protection of the welfare of vulnerable children.   
 
Inability to Consent to Administration of Blood  
There was also a flurry of cases in the 1990s concerned with the question whether it 
was in the best interests of a child whose parents were Jehovah’s Witnesses to have 
a blood transfusion. Re R,50 Re S,51and Re O52 were also concerned with determining 
the responsibilities of doctors, local authorities, and the courts when genuinely held 
parental beliefs as to their child’s best interests presented, in the view of the child’s 
doctors as demonstrated by their evidence to the court, a risk of causing the child 
significant harm. This was because parental refusal of consent to the administration of 
blood to a seriously ill child was preventing the administration of treatment 
recommended by the treating doctors and in their clinical judgement putting the child 
at risk of death. Booth J, in Re R, considered that the local authority had rightly applied 
for leave for a Specific Issue Order permitting the administration of blood to 10 month-
old R who was being treated for B-cell lymphoblastic leukaemia. The evidence was 
that without the administration of blood R’s treatment would not be successful. The 
local authority in Re S sought leave for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction 
and make an order permitting the transfusion of blood to S, a 4 year-old child receiving 
treatment for T-cell leukaemia. S’s consultant paediatrician believed that S’s condition 
had deteriorated so that palliative care was the only alternative to conventional 
treatment which required the administration of blood. In Re O, the application was 
likewise brought to court by the local authority, O’s consultant having sought the advice 
of the local authority at the point he thought a transfusion was immediately necessary 
for O who had respiratory distress syndrome.53 In each case, the opinion of the treating 
doctor that without the administration of blood the child was at risk of significant harm 
had prompted their inquiry of the local authority and the local authority application to 
court. 
 
Whilst applications in such cases are now made by the NHS Trust,54 rather than the 
local authority, the approach of court was established in these early cases. The 
administration of blood will be authorised if the situation is imminently life-threatening, 
in other circumstances requiring consultation with the child’s parents permitting the 
administration of blood if there is no reasonable alternative. A reasonable alternative 
must surely be one that can be administered to the child in fulfilment of the doctor’s 
legal duties to identify a treatment option that is supported by a competent body of 
professional opinion. Under the current legal framework, the legal issue in these cases 
is not whether the religious views of the parents should be respected. The child is an 
independent legal person and once the question of the administration of blood to the 
child is before the court, the legal duty of the judge is to make an independent 
assessment of the child’s best interests, in these cases of children who were too young 
                                                 
48  Re X (A Child) [2020] EWHC 3003 [8], [19]. 
49  Brazier M and Bridge C, 'Coercion or caring: analysing adolescent autonomy' (1996) 
16 Legal Studies 84, 93-96. 
50  Re R [1993] 2 FLR 757. 
51  Re S [1993] 1 FLR 376 
52  Re O [1993] 2 FLR 149. 
53  Re O [1993] 2 FLR 149, 155. 
54  Eg Birmingham Children’s NHS Trust v B and C [2014] EWHC 531; Cardiff and Vale 
University Health Board v T and H [2019] EWHC 1671; An NHS Trust v CX [2019] 
EWHC 3033. 
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to have accepted their parents’ beliefs or to have formed their own.55 It is not the 
responsibility of judges to assess the reasonableness of parental views, whether it is 
religious or other beliefs that determine parental decisions about their child’s medical 
treatment. Parents are free to raise their children according to the tenets of their 
religion but when decisions about a child’s medical treatment are before the court, 
whilst the judge will consider the views of the child’s parents, the duty of the judge is 
to make an independent determination of the best interests of the child on the basis of 
the evidence.  
 
Termination of Pregnancy  
There are few reported cases concerning the termination of a child’s pregnancy, 
although those that have been reported are located at both ends of the body of case 
law concerning children’s medical treatment. They demonstrate the local authority, 
Trust, and the court working together to protect the welfare of the child. In Re B, the 
local authority applied for 12 year-old B to be made a ward of court having been 
informed of her pregnancy by her GP. The termination was authorised by two 
registered medical practitioners in accordance with the Abortion Act 1967. Whilst B 
wanted the pregnancy to be terminated, a decision of the court was sought given her 
age and the objection of her mother to the termination.56 Parental objection to the 
termination prompted the local authority application to court for a declaration on the 
legality of the termination of the pregnancy of 15 year-old Shirley in Re P.57 Shirley had 
been committed to the care of the local authority under the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1969 following her conviction for theft. Whilst in care she had become 
pregnant and was caring for her son in a mother and child unit. Pregnant for a second 
time, Shirley had decided that the pregnancy should be terminated as she would not 
be able to care for both children in the unit.  Her father opposed this offering to care 
for her son so that Shirley could care for the new baby. The local authority applied for 
her to be made a ward of court which directed the termination in accordance with her 
decision and the medical view that a termination was lawful under the provisions of the 
Abortion Act 1967.  Butler-Sloss J noted that although the local authority had, by virtue 
of the 1969 Act, the rights and obligations of a parent to a child in their care it had 
sought the authority of the court as it did not want to override the view of her father.58 
The judge considered this to be an appropriate case in which to assume jurisdiction 
and gave the doctors authority to perform the procedure without otherwise interfering 
with the powers of the local authority with respect to her care.59 The decision of the 
court on the specific issue of the termination protected Shirley’s decision and the local 
authority and doctors who agreed with it from legal challenge by Shirley’s father. 
  
Whilst the pregnancy of a young teenager will require that consideration is given to 
child protection issues, the approach of the courts in the cases on the termination of 
the pregnancy of a child has been that protection of her wishes, formed and maintained 
after discussion with supportive adults, protects her best interests. In The matter of X 
(a child),60 care proceedings had commenced with respect to 13 year-old X, described 
                                                 
55  Sir James Munby noted in Re X (A Child) [2020] EWHC 3003 the inevitable tension 
between the duty of the court and the established beliefs of a Gillick competent child 
[3] given that the duty of the court, without debating the merits of religious views and 
taking into consideration the views of a competent child, is to reach the judges own 
determination of what is in the best interests of the child when there is clear evidence 
of a serious risk to health or to life [12], [13]. 
56  Re B [1991] 2 FLR 426. 
57  Re P [1986] 1 FLR 272. 
58  Re P [1986] 1 FLR 272, 274. After the Children Act 1989, the local authority application 
would have had to be under s.100(3) for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.  
59  Re P [1986] 1 FLR 272, 276. 
60  In the matter of X (a child) [2014] EWHC 1871.  
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by the consultant clinical psychologist as a ‘very damaged and impaired young girl’, 
who lacked the capacity to make the decision. At the start of proceedings X was 
opposed to a termination. As a consequence the expert evidence was that a 
termination would not be in her best interests. During the course of the proceedings, X 
changed her mind. As Kirsty Moreton has observed, the unanimous view of the experts 
that termination was not in X’s best interests was followed by the determination of the 
court that it was following her expression during the hearing of a wish to terminate the 
pregnancy.61 The judge emphasised that, whilst X lacked the capacity to consent, she 
needed to indicate her views and through her words and actions demonstrate that she 
was ‘compliant’ and ‘accepting’. Munby P made the declaration that the termination 
would be lawful as in X’s best interests as long as X, after discussing the termination 
with her social worker and step-mother, continued for two days to express a wish to 
terminate the pregnancy. Child protection issues were to be dealt with in care 
proceedings and the question whether any criminal offences had been committed were 
for the police. Whilst the jurisdiction of the court is a protective one, in the application 
brought by the Trust, the sole issue was the specific one of the legality of terminating 
the pregnancy of a 13 year-old who lacked the capacity to give consent. Likewise, the 
application by the Trust in An NHS Trust v A, B, C and A Local Authority,62 was made 
in circumstances where it was not certain whether 13 year-old A had the capacity to 
consent to the termination but if she did to reassure the doctors of the lawfulness of 
performing the termination. Mostyn J concluded that A had sufficient understanding 
and intelligence to make the decision.63 The judge noted that there had been meetings 
with the Trust’s safeguarding team and that, should A decide to continue with the 
pregnancy, she would require considerable support from both her family and social 
services. The limited case law on the termination of a pregnancy thus demonstrate 
local authorities and Trusts working together to protect the interests of vulnerable 
young women and girls. The decisions of the courts in these cases recognise that the 
termination of pregnancy is an issue upon which people have different opinions and 
their own decisions will be influenced by their current circumstances. The courts will 
protect the decisions of young girls in relation to the termination of a pregnancy, as 
long as termination is lawful in accordance with the Abortion Act 1967, ensuring that 
their wishes are determinative whether or not they have capacity but seeking to ensure 
that the decision is an established one formed through discussion with supportive 
adults. Wider concerns about the welfare of a young girl who has become pregnant 
are addressed by the local authority and, if appropriate, the court in child protection 
proceedings.  
 
Immunisation: Enabling Public Care 
The law on the issue of immunisation was framed by disputes between parents but 
King LJ suggested in the recent Court of Appeal judgment in Re H that it might be time 
to reconsider the approach of the courts to the issue of immunisation in private law 
disputes between parents as had the court in that case with respect to cases brought 
before the courts by the local authority.64 In Re H, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
                                                 
61  Kirsty Moreton, ‘Gillick reinstated: judging mid-childhood competence in healthcare 
law’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 303, 310. 
62  In An NHS Trust v A, B, C and A Local Authority [2014] EWHC 1445. 
63  Kirsty Moreton welcomed the ‘determinative’ approach to competence whilst arguing 
that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 should be applied to people of all ages and argued 
for a more relational approach to decision-making, ‘Gillick reinstated: judging mid-
childhood competence in healthcare law’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 303. 
64  Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination) [2020] EWCA Civ 664. The earlier 
private law cases are Re W (A Child)  [2000] 3 WLUK 200; Re C and F (Children) 
[2003] EWHC 1376 upheld on appeal B (Child) [2003] EWCA Civ 1148; F v F (MMR 
Vaccine) [2013] EWHC 2683; In the Matter of M and N [2016] EWFC 69 and unusually 
In the Matter of M and N (no 2) [2017] EWFC 49 upon the application of the Guardian 
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decision of Hayden J in the court below made against the background of a history of 
contested proceedings with regard to the care of T and contrary to the earlier case of 
Re SL,65 that the local authority could authorise routine vaccinations within the scope 
of s.33(3) of the Children Act 1989. When a care order is made with respect to a child, 
the local authority gains parental responsibility by virtue of s.33(3)(a) and the power to 
determine the extent to which other holders of parental responsibility may meet that 
responsibility which the local authority must do in accordance with their overarching 
duty to protect and safeguard the welfare of the child.66 Hayden J had followed earlier 
case law in distinguishing vaccination from medical treatment as a ‘facet of public 
preventative healthcare intending to protect both individual children and society more 
generally’ and thus appropriately a matter for parents in the exercise of their parental 
responsibility rather than a decision for the State.67 King LJ considered that 
preventative healthcare and medical treatment overlapped but that the distinction was 
that, where there are no contra-indications to vaccination in relation to the child in 
question, the vaccination of children in accordance with Public Health England’s 
guidance, The Green Book: Information for public health professionals on 
immunisations was not a ‘grave’ issue.68 This conclusion was based upon a review of 
the medical evidence on the risks of contracting each disease, the nature of the illness, 
and the risks of side-effects from the vaccination. The judge reviewed the MMR 
controversy observing that it was concerns about the safety of the MMR vaccine which 
had led to concerns about the safety of vaccines more generally, had resulted in the 
involvement of the court in both private and public law cases, and continued to be at 
root of parental objection to vaccination.69 The evidence led her Ladyship to conclude 
that the study by Dr Andrew Wakefield, published in The Lancet in 1998, which claimed 
there was a link between the MMR vaccine and autism and had led to a fall in rates of 
                                                 
who wished the order to be enforced, the order was varied to remove the requirement 
for vaccination whilst the declaration that it was in the children’s best interests 
remained; Re B (A Child: Immunisation) [2018] EWFC 56; Two cases had been brought 
by local authorities Re A, B, C and D (Welfare of Children: Immunisation) [2011] EWHC 
4033 and Re SL (Permission to vaccinate) [2017] EWHC 125.  
65  Re SL (Permission to vaccinate) [2017] EWHC 125, [32]-[33], In which MacDonald J 
held that, because of the gravity of the issue, s.33 did not give the local authority power 
to consent to vaccination overriding parental objection but that the local authority 
should apply to the court for a declaration in the exercise of the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction.  
66  Children Act 1989, ss.33(3)(b) & 33(4). Subsections 6-8 places limits upon the local 
authority’s exercise of parental responsibility so that it may not change a child’s religion, 
agree to adoption, appoint a guardian, change the child’s surname without written 
agreement or (without going through prescribed procedures) remove the child from the 
United Kingdom for more than a month without written agreement 
67  London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M & F & T [2020] EWHC 220 [12] following B 
(Child) [2003] EWCA Civ 1148 [22], rather than non-essential invasive treatment; Re B 
(A Child: Immunisation) [2018] EWFC 56 [2]. 
68  Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination) [2020] EWCA Civ 664, [85]. On 
the facts, Hayden J made the declarations given that the history of proceedings left him 
in no doubt that if the local authority had sought to have T vaccinated in the exercise 
of their parental responsibility T’s parents would have applied for the court to exercise 
its inherent jurisdiction. 
69  Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination) [2020] EWCA Civ 664, [42]-
[54].Sumner J noted the MMR litigation in Re C and F (Children) [2003] EWHC 1376, 
[22]; F v F (MMR Vaccine) [2013] EWHC 2683 was specifically concerned with the 
MMR vaccine, the parents having agreed that L should not have the booster and M 
should not have the vaccine after the Wakefield paper. The father made the application 
concerned about the potentially serious consequences of contracting the diseases 
given that Wakefield’s study had been discredited and prompted by the then recent 
outbreak of measles in Wales, [3]-[4]. 
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MMR vaccination and an increased questioning of the safety of the vaccination 
programme more generally had been discredited by 2010. Subsequent studies had 
found no evidence of a link between MMR and autism. Her Ladyship expressed the 
view that, absent new peer-reviewed research evidence indicating significant concern 
about the efficacy and/or safety of one of the recommended vaccines, objections to 
vaccination based on general concerns about efficacy or safety would be unlikely to 
be upheld.70 Absent evidence of a specific vaccine being contraindicated for a 
particular child, the medical evidence was that vaccination in accordance with the 
recommended schedule was in the best interests of the child and with those exceptions 
the courts had, in all cases, authorised vaccination.71 
 
Re H held that the decision to consent to routine vaccination came within the general 
duties of the local authority to safeguard and promote the welfare of looked after 
children.72 This enabled local authorities to fulfil their public responsibility to protect the 
welfare of children in their care informed by the prevailing view that immunisation is in 
the welfare of all children73 and particularly those whose upbringing has otherwise 
been chaotic or neglectful. In Re H the local authority had taken over T’s care to provide 
him with,  
 
‘a safe, consistent and emotionally stable family environment free from the risks 
posed by neglect, addiction and exposure to domestic violence in order to thrive 
and develop to fulfil his potential. It is important that he has equitable access to 
all aspects of child health including vaccination against preventable illnesses, 
health promotion, and monitoring of his growth and development’.74 
 
King LJ posed the question whether vaccination should remain within that small group 
of cases in private law to which all holders of parental responsibility must be agreed or 
an order of the court is required. Removal of vaccination from the group of issues 
requiring the agreement of all with parental responsibility or a decision of the court will 
not prevent all future cases, as with other issues in relation to the upbringing of a child 
upon which holders of parental responsibility are unable to agree, a SIO or PSO order 
could still be sought to resolve private law disputes over vaccination. However, the 
case of Re H means that the approach to the welfare of the child in cases that are 
before the courts could not be clearer. As MacDonald J subsequently observed in M v 
H & P & T, the consequence is that it is ‘very difficult now to foresee’ that vaccination 
would not be considered to be in a child’s best interests unless there was new medical 
or research evidence or a specific contraindication for a particular vaccine in relation 
to an individual child.75 On the issue of vaccinations, public and private law has 
developed in step, demonstrating the need for a better appreciation of the relationship 
between public and private responsibilities for the welfare of children.   
     
Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-sustaining Treatment 
The need for analysis of the relationship between public and private responsibilities for 
the welfare of children is also evident with regard to the law governing the withholding 
                                                 
70  Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination) [2020] EWCA Civ 664, [55]. 
71  Those cases in fn 64. In Re C and F (Children) [2003] EWHC 1376, vaccinations 
against  whooping cough and Hib were not age appropriate for 12 year-old F nor 
vaccinations against tuberculosis or tubercular meningitis for 4 year-old C.   
72  Children Act 1989, s.22(3)(a). 
73  Richard Huxtable has argued that immunisation is a public health measure so that the 
welfare of the individual child may not be the appropriate focus, ‘Re C (A Child) 
(Immunisation: Parental Rights [2003] EWCA Civ 1148’ (2004) 26 Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 69-77.  
74  London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M & F & T [2020] EWHC 220, [30]. 
75  M v H & P & T [2020] EWFC 93, [52]. 
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or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from children with life-limiting conditions. The 
initial cases, in which the courts established the legal principles governing these cases, 
were referred to court by local authorities. The courts have also addressed the scope 
of s.33 of the Children Act 1989, the exercise of parental responsibility by parents and 
the local authority, and the role of the court in relation to decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from children in care. And, I argue, in the concluding 
section below, that the public responsibilities evident in cases in which the local 
authority has responsibility for the care of children have framed the approach of the 
court to all cases of treatment decisions concerning children with life-limiting 
conditions.   
 
In Re C and Re J (1991) the court noted the lack of guidance for those required to 
make decisions about the provision of life-sustaining treatment to children. In both 
cases, the child had been made a ward of court, whilst the local authority retained ‘care 
and control’ over the child. Neither child had left hospital since birth. Court involvement 
was inevitable; as a ward, all major decisions about the child’s upbringing had to be 
made by the court.  In Re C, Balcombe LJ highlighted the lack of guidance from the 
legislature for courts or others – parents, professionals, local authorities - in such 
cases.76 The responsibility of the judge, his Lordship emphasised, was to undertake a 
best interests analysis. The purpose of the judgment of the court was to explain clearly 
the reasons for the decision of the court and the course of treatment to be administered 
to a baby in the care of the state ensuring that the decision could be subjected to 
scrutiny and the issues raised examined in wider debate. 
 
In Re J (1991), the following year, Lord Donaldson noted that the Official Solicitor had 
asked for guidance on ‘the generality of the problem’ and sought to assist those who 
have to make such decisions by offering some clarification.77 When the decision was 
before the court, in wardship, the judge was to give paramount importance to the best 
interests of the child in determination of which there is a ‘very strong presumption in 
favour of a course of action which will prolong life’ and taking into account the pain and 
suffering caused by the treatment and the quality of life which the child will experience 
if life is prolonged, from the assumed point of view of the child.78 But that ‘intolerability’ 
was not, as had been submitted to the court, a ‘quasi-statutory yardstick.’79  
 
Further, Lord Donaldson MR distinguished the duties of parents, doctors, and court. 
Whilst parents and the court, which ‘takes over the rights and duties of the parents’, 
must give consent to a child’s medical treatment according to their judgement of best 
interests, the legal duty of the doctor is to care for the child according to ‘good medical 
practice recognised as appropriate by a competent body of professional opinion’.80 In 
ideal circumstances, doctors, parents, and when involved, the court work together in 
partnership to secure the course of action that is in the best interests of the child.  
Whilst parents and the court must determine the child’s best interests neither parents 
nor the court can require doctors to administer treatment that is ‘medically contra-
indicated’ or which they could not ‘conscientiously administer’. Re J (1991), together 
with the second Re J (1993) over which Lord Donaldson also presided and in which 
he affirmed those principles,81 have had a profound and enduring effect upon the 
                                                 
76  Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] Fam 26, 38. 
77  Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] Fam 33, 47.    
78  Re J [1991] Fam 33, 46.  
79  Re J [1991] Fam 33, 46. 
80  Re J [1991] Fam 33, 41 quoting Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 
[1957] 1 WLR 582. 
81  Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15 
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principles and approach of the courts in children’s decision-making cases.82 
Determined in wardship proceedings with the consequence that the responsibly of the 
judge was to undertake a best interests analysis, decisions about the future medical 
treatment of both children were brought before the courts by local authorities who had 
legal and caring responsibilities to them. It was important that these cases were 
brought before the court not just to reassure the children’s doctors that to withhold life-
sustaining treatment would not amount to a civil wrong or criminal offence but more 
importantly, as Lord Donaldson MR had observed in Re C, given the public interest in 
decisions to limit treatment to a vulnerable child in the care of the state.  
    
A further issue concerns the respective responsibilities, within s.33 of the Children Act 
1989, of the local authority, parents, doctors, and the court in relation to decisions to 
limit life-sustaining treatment to children in care. Given the profound and enduring 
consequences of such decisions, decisions about withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from a child in care come within the category of decisions to which 
all with parental responsibility must agree or a court order is required. In Kirklees 
Council v RE and Others,83 the local authority made an application for a declaration 
that it was not in SE’s best interests to receive further life-sustaining treatment and in 
his best interests to receive palliative care. SE had lung, heart and kidney conditions. 
An Interim Care Order had been made soon after his birth. Although, as he had 
remained in hospital since his premature birth, he had not been able to live with his 
foster carers they spent time with him daily at the hospital. The application was 
supported by the Trust, by SE’s Guardian, and his mother accepted the medical 
opinion as she did not want him to suffer. Moor J agreed with Counsel for the local 
authority that an application had to be made to court in cases where ‘there is parental 
opposition, parental equivocation or doubt as to parental capacity to decide’.84 Whilst 
the local authority had parental responsibility for the child by virtue of the ICO, to 
protect the interests of the child and ensure that the views of the parent were properly 
taken into consideration on such a grave matter, it was necessary to bring the matter 
before the court.   
 
Where the child’s parents lack the capacity to decide about life-limiting treatment a 
decision of the court is required as consent cannot be provided by all with parental 
responsibility. In Re Jake the local authority shared parental responsibility with the 
parents of ten month-old Jake under an Interim Care Order. Both parents had a 
diagnosed learning disability. His father had the capacity to litigate whilst his mother 
did not.85 Jake’s parents and the local authority agreed with his doctors that, in the 
event of a deterioration in his condition, Jake should be given palliative care. As Munby 
P observed, the local authority had encouraged the Trust to apply for the court to 
exercise its inherent jurisdiction on the basis that it was ‘not appropriate’ for the local 
authority alone to consent to the withholding of life-sustaining treatment.86 Sir James 
Munby P emphasised the importance of facilitating the involvement of parents who 
lack capacity to make decisions about their child’s future medical care.  The President 
stressed that the parents must be involved, told what was happening, and what was 
being proposed.87 The views, wishes, and feelings of the parents who ‘faced with this 
                                                 
82  Providing the basis for the legal principles applied in contemporary cases eg GOSH v 
Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972, [38]-[41]. 
83  Kirklees Council v RE and Others [2014] EWHC 3182. 
84  Kirklees Council v RE and Others [2014] EWHC 3182, [20]. 
85  Re Jake [2015] EWHC 2442, [3]. 
86  Re Jake [2015] EWHC 2442, [48]. 
87  Re Jake [2015] EWHC 2442, [46]. 
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dreadful situation, very much understand the fundamental dilemmas and the 
fundamental problems’ had to be taken into account.88  
  
The decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a child is as 
profound a decision as is possible to be made in the exercise of parental responsibility. 
When the child is not in the care of the local authority, the child’s treating doctors would 
be acting lawfully if they withdrew or withheld life-sustaining medical treatment upon 
the consent of one holder of parental responsibility. Although, given the grave nature 
of a decision which will lead to the death of the child, where both parents are actively 
involved, in practice the treatment will continue until both agree that it is no longer in 
the best interests of the child or there is a decision of the court.89 Where questions 
arise about the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a child in the 
care of the state, it is vital that grave treatment decisions are either agreed by all with 
parental responsibility together with the child’s doctors or by a court. This is necessary 
to protect the interests of a child vulnerable by virtue of his or her medical condition, 
the inability of his or her parents to care for and advocate for him or her and, with 
continued medical intervention, the prospect of life in intensive care or in the care of 
the state. There are limits to the local authority exercise of parental responsibility, 
where decisions about a child’s medical treatment may result in the ending of his or 
her life, the local authority cannot act alone. The agreement of all with responsibility 
for the child or the decision of the court ensures that the decision is made according to 
a judgement of the best interests of the child, in cases of any doubt, publicly by an 
independent judge in a process in which the decision-maker can be held to account. 
The responsibility of the court is to ensure a process in which the interests of vulnerable 
children of vulnerable parents in the care of the state are properly protected.     
 
Public Responsibilities for the Welfare of Children 
The final question is the relevance of this analysis to the recent high profile cases 
concerning Charlie Gard,90 Isaiah Haastrup,91 Alfie Evans92 and Tafida Raqeeb.93 
None of these children were in the care of the local authority. In all cases, their parents 
had done all they could to ensure that their seriously ill child received the best possible 
treatment and care, had researched their child’s condition and identified alternative 
care providers when those with responsibility for their child’s clinical care had reached 
the view that there were no more treatment options which had a chance of improving 
the child’s condition. In all cases, despite having reached a different conclusion to the 
doctors about their child’s future care, the parents were seeking to do their very best 
for their child. The analogies drawn with child protection proceedings in submissions 
                                                 
88  Re Jake [2015] EWHC 2442, [44]. 
89  As in Re RB [2010] 1 FLR 946 and although An NHS Trust v SR [2012] EWHC 3842 
was concerned with the administration of conventional radiotherapy and 
chemotherapy, Bodey J observed that the doctors could have treated given the consent 
of the child’s father but that he appreciated why the Trust had applied to court given 
the serious nature of the treatment at issue.   
90  The declarations made by Francis J, in GOSH v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972, that 
it was in Charlie’s best interests and lawful for him not to be provided with a trial of 
nucleoside therapy and for ventilation to be withdrawn and palliative care provided were 
upheld through the appeal courts. 
91  The declarations made by MacDonald J in King’s College NHS Trust v Thomas & 
Haastrup [2018] EWHC 127 were upheld through the appeal courts. 
92  The declarations made by Hayden J in Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v 
Evans [2018] EWHC 308 that it was in Alfie’s best interests and lawful for ventilation to 
be withdrawn and palliative care provided were upheld by the appeal courts. 
93  Tafida Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 2531 (Admin) & Barts NHS 
Foundation Trust v Shalina Begum and Muhhamed Raqeeb & Tafida Raqeeb [2019] 
EWHC 2530 (Fam). 
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on appeal were made in the attempt to secure what they considered to be in the best 
interests of the child.94 However, not only was the law applied in these cases founded 
in the cases considered above, but the public responsibility to ensure that the care the 
child received protected their welfare equally applied to limit parental freedom to 
pursue what they considered to be best for their child. 
 
The legal framework applied by the judges of the Family Division, upheld by the Court 
of Appeal and Supreme Court had its foundations in the judgments of Heilbron J in Re 
D95 and the House of Lords in Re B.96 In each case, the judge applied a best interests 
analysis to determine the child’s future medical treatment. The approach taken to 
determination of best interests was based in the judgments of Lord Donaldson MR in 
the 1990s cases of J in which he also held that neither parents nor the court could 
require doctors to administer treatment that is ‘medically contra-indicated’ or which 
they could not ‘conscientiously administer’.97 Although not stated in such terms given 
the focus upon determination of best interests, the evidence suggests that that was 
the position of the treating doctors in each of these cases and that their professional 
judgement was supported by second opinions and independent experts.98 
 
The question raised by each of these cases was why should the parents of Charlie 
Gard, Isaiah Haastrup, Alfie Evans, and Tafida Raqeeb not be free to move their child 
to the care of another doctor willing to take responsibility for them when those currently 
responsible for the child’s medical treatment had reached the view that there were no 
more treatment options available. In all cases the hospital had applied to court for a 
declaration that it would be lawful, as in the child’s best interests, to withdraw life-
sustaining ventilation and to provide palliative care. Charlie’s parents wanted him to 
receive innovative nucleoside bypass therapy which, at the time legal proceedings 
were commenced, was being offered by an expert in the US but which his medical 
team considered, because of the extent of the damage to his brain, no longer offered 
him any chance of improvement. Isaiah’s parents wanted his life to be sustained on 
ventilation. Alfie’s parents wanted him to be transferred to Italy, where doctors were 
prepared to offer long term ventilation or to Germany where a doctor was willing to 
undertake a tracheostomy and gastrostomy with the aim of enabling to home 
ventilation. Tafida’s parents also wanted her to be transferred to Italy where doctors 
were prepared to continue ventilation, taking more time to determine whether she could 
be provided with home ventilation. However, with the exception of Tafida, in all of these 
cases it was the unanimous view of the treating team, supported by independent 
experts and second opinions, that there were no further treatment options available 
which could improve the child’s condition and, consequently, continued ventilation 
would mean that the children would live the remainder of their life kept alive in intensive 
care and, due to their condition, without the ability to benefit from interaction with those 
who cared for them.  
 
Ordinarily, decisions about a child’s medical treatment are private decisions, reached 
by parents working in partnership with the treatment team to agree upon the treatment 
                                                 
94  Explored, for example in, Goold I, Herring J and Auckland C(eds), Parental Rights, 
Best Interests and Significant Harms: Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children 
Post-Great Ormond Street Hospital v Gard (Hart, 2019). 
95  Re D [1976] Fam 185. 
96  Re B [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
97  Re J [1991] Fam 33, Re J [1993] Fam 15. 
98  As argued in Jo Bridgeman, ‘Beyond Best Interests: A Question of Professional 
Conscience?’  in Parental Rights, Best Interests and Significant Harms: Medical 
Decision-Making on Behalf of Children Post-Great Ormond Street Hospital v Gard, 
Imogen Goold, Jonathan Herring and Cressida Auckland (eds), Hart, 2019, 137-152. 
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plan that is in the best interests of the child. The welfare of the child is protected by the 
agreed, or at least accepted, determination of best interests by those primarily 
responsible for the care of the child, his or her parents and treating team.  However, it 
is because parental responsibility to determine the best interests of the child co-exists 
with the legal duties of doctors to children that when doctors are not able, in the 
exercise of their professional judgement and in accordance with their professional 
conscience, to treat according to the wishes of parents, the dispute must be referred 
to court. The responsibility of the judge is then to decide the course of action that is in 
the welfare of the child on the evidence presented to the court. There are limits on the 
freedom of parents to make decisions about the medical treatment of their child when 
the doctors with legal duties cannot accede to their preferences framed by, as 
MacDonald J has put it, the Trust’s ‘safeguarding obligations in relation children who 
are not deriving benefit from life sustaining treatment’.99 The parents, families, and 
supporters of Charlie, Isaiah, and Alfie felt strongly that the doctors and the judge 
reached the wrong conclusion. However, the evidence before the court that there was 
no prospect of any improvement, that the child could not experience the love, care, 
and attention given to them and that the prospect for their future was to be kept alive 
through invasive interventions on an intensive care ward. Taken together this led to 
the conclusion that it was not in the child’s interests for life-sustaining intervention to 
continue.        
 
The public policy requirement to bring a dispute between parents and doctors over a 
child’s medical treatment before a court was recently addressed by MacDonald J in 
the case of Tafida Raqeeb. In the context of a dispute between her parents and treating 
doctors, and equally applicable I argue in relation to children without a relational 
advocate, MacDonald J identified these as, the public interest in the protection of a 
child’s best interests as one of the fundamental interests of society, ensuring that a 
child has an independent voice when those most directly involved disagree and 
securing the equal treatment of all children in such cases.100 His Lordship also 
explained that determination by the court ensures that the welfare and rights of the 
child are protected, that parental decisions are subjected to scrutiny and that 
professionals can fulfil their legal and professional duties to children in their care in 
fulfilment of their duties of care and under s.11(2)(a) of the Children Act 2004.101 The 
decision to give Tafida’s parents permission to transfer her to Genoa to allow more 
time to ascertain whether she would regain her capacities was based upon evidence 
from a responsible body of medical opinion that she should be maintained on life 
support ‘with a view to placing her in a position where she can be cared for at home 
on ventilation by a loving and dedicated family in the same manner in which a number 
of children in a similar situation to Tafida are treated in this jurisdiction’.102 The evidence 
before the court was therefore that the treatment which her parents wanted her to 
receive was supported by a responsible body of professional opinion so that the 
parental determination of her best interests was supported by professional judgement 
about her welfare. This was determined in legal proceedings when her treating doctors 
                                                 
99  Tafida Raqeeb (by her Litigation Friend) v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 
2531 (Admin) & Barts NHS Foundation Trust v Shalina Begum and Muhhamed Raqeeb 
& Tafida Raqeeb (by her Children’s Guardian) [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam), [56]. 
100  Tafida Raqeeb (by her Litigation Friend) v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 
2531 (Admin) & Barts NHS Foundation Trust v Shalina Begum and Muhhamed Raqeeb 
& Tafida Raqeeb (by her Children’s Guardian) [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam), [151]. 
101  Tafida Raqeeb (by her Litigation Friend) v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 
2531 (Admin) & Barts NHS Foundation Trust v Shalina Begum and Muhhamed Raqeeb 
& Tafida Raqeeb (by her Children’s Guardian) [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam), [55].  
102  Tafida Raqeeb (by her Litigation Friend) v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 
2531 (Admin) & Barts NHS Foundation Trust v Shalina Begum and Muhhamed Raqeeb 
& Tafida Raqeeb (by her Children’s Guardian) [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam), [186]. 
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had reached the conclusion that continued ventilation was not in her interests. State 
intervention, through the courts, ensured that Tafida’s best interests were protected. 
  
Lord Sumption, in his 2019 Reith Lectures,103 expressed the view that Charlie Gard’s 
case would not have reached the courts a generation ago. A generation ago, the case 
may have been seen as one of parental authority and right to determine the future 
medical treatment of their child. A generation ago, Charlie’s case may have been 
formative of the principles governing the provision of medical treatment to children 
rather than an unsuccessful challenge to established principles. I respectfully disagree 
with Lord Sumption’s characterisation of the case as a troubling example of Law’s 
Expanding Empire into the domain of the private. I argue that the case demonstrates 
that there are public, as well as a parental and professional, responsibilities for the 
welfare of children, including those whose parents are desperately seeking to do what 
they consider to be best for them. Cases concerned with a child’s medical treatment 
are not only concerned with the best interests of the child, they are also concerned 
with fundamental questions about the public responsibilities for the care and protection 
of children.  
 
Public responsibility, through local authority responsibilities, was formative in the early 
cases and continues to be important today in cases concerning vulnerable children in 
the care of the state who do not have parents advocating for them as did Charlie, 
Isasiah, Alfie, and Tafida. The shared responsibility for support, protection, and care 
means that the court has an important function in the determination of grave issues 
affecting the lives of vulnerable children in local authority care ensuring that their 
welfare is protected and decisions can be subjected to scrutiny and debate. And, when 
those with parental responsibility and professional duties cannot agree on the best 
interests of the child, those same shared responsibilities justify public intervention in 
family life. Parental responsibilities are constrained by professional duties and public 
responsibilities to protect the welfare of children. 
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103  Lord Sumption, Law’s Expanding Empire, Reith Lectures 2019, BBC Radio 4. 
